The psychology of East Asians differs from that of Westerners in many fundamental ways. To name a few, the two cultural groups differ in the ways of construing the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) , evaluating the self (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999) , judging morality (Miller, 1994) , seeking causality (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999) , thinking (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001) , and achieving happiness (Diener & Suh, 1999) . Recently, Peng (1997; Peng & Nisbett, 1999) presented another important criterion that separates East Asians from Westerners: the way of dealing with contradiction.
Based on other scholars' work (e.g., Liu, 1974; Needham, 1962 Needham, /1978 Zhang & Chen, 1991) , Peng proposed that Chinese (and other East Asians by extension) take a dialectical approach to apparent contradiction, accepting apparent contradiction as rational. The term dialectical refers to the way of dealing with contradictions by Chinese (and other East Asians), which is not the same as the Hegelian dialectic of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. However, the difference between Chinese dialectic and the Hegelian dialectic is beyond the scope of this article (see Peng & Nisbett, 1999, for this issue) .
In East Asians' dialectical thinking, there is no necessary incompatibility between the belief that A and not A both have merit. Indeed, in the spirit of the Tao or yinyang principle, A can actually imply that not A is also the case-the opposite of a state of affairs can exist simultaneously with the state of affairs itself (Chang, 1939; Mao, 1937 Mao, /1962 . It is this belief that lies behind much of Asian thought designed to find the "Middle Way" between extremes-accepting that two parties to a quarrel can both have right on their side or that two opposing propositions can both contain some truth.
An apparent contradiction occurs when two pieces of information are inconsistent with each other in such a way that if one of them is true, then it is likely that the other is false. Confronted with contradiction, East Asians attempt to reconcile the opposing propositions, seeking the "Middle Way" or attempting to transcend any apparent contradiction. In stark contrast, Westerners, whose intellectual culture has long been wedded to the importance of avoiding a contradiction, tend to seek to determine whether A or not A is the case and reject completely the proposition that is less plausible.
To support the thesis that there is a fundamental difference in the way East Asians and Westerners react to contradiction, Peng (1997; Peng & Nisbett, 1999) provided a set of empirical evidence that even contemporary Chinese maintain the tradition of dialecticism. For example, Chinese participants, compared to American participants, (a) preferred dialectical proverbs that accept rather than deny a contradiction (e.g., "Sorrow is born of excessive joy") to nondialectical proverbs that reflect the rule of noncontradiction (e.g., "Half a loaf is better than none"), (b) actively sought dialectical or compromise solutions to avoid interpersonal conflicts, (c) preferred arguments based on holistic principles to those based on the rule of noncontradiction, and (d) accepted two opposing arguments as both true rather than trying to choose one over the other as was typical of American participants. In short, East Asians resolve contradiction by accepting two opposing propositions simultaneously, whereas Americans resolve it by accepting only the more plausible one.
The present research built on these findings and attempted to examine whether the dialectical tendency among East Asians to hold inconsistent beliefs simultaneously would be true even for one of the most private and important beliefs people possess: self-concept. Specifically, the present research tested the hypothesis that East Asians (Koreans in the present research) would be more likely than Westerners (Americans in the present research) to hold inconsistent beliefs about the self, which we call self-concept flexibility.
Culture and the Self-Concept Variability
What makes our hypothesis more plausible is evidence from the cultural psychology of self, indicating that East Asians' self-concepts are more multifaceted and variable than Westerners' self-concepts. For instance, Cousins (1989) found that Japanese self-concepts were context-specific, whereas Americans' self-concepts were context-general. Cousins (1989) asked Japanese and American college students to describe themselves in the Twenty Statement Test (TST) (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954) , in which they were asked to complete 20 statements beginning with the words I am . . . . Cousins (1989) found that American participants used general abstract personality traits (e.g., "I am curious," "I am sincere") three times as often as did Japanese participants. Japanese descriptions of self more often reflected their social identities (e.g., "I am a Keiyo student") or referred to specific contexts (e.g., "I am one who plays Mah-Jongg on Friday nights"). In short, Japanese self-descriptions were contextualized rather than abstract and specific rather than general. Rhee, Uleman, Lee, and Roman (1996) found a similar pattern for Koreans. They administered the same TST to American, Korean American, and Korean students. Koreans' self-descriptions were more contextspecific and social than those of Americans. Americans' self-descriptions were more context-general and dispositional. In other words, Americans tended to view themselves possessing a set of abstract, situationtranscending dispositions. Therefore, their self-views are likely to be consistent across situations. However, because Koreans' self-descriptions are context-specific and social as opposed to context-general and dispositional, their self-views would be constrained by a given context and consequently would be variable across situations. These studies suggest that, relatively speaking, East Asians have "multiple" selves contingent on the context, whereas Americans have a unitary self-concept not bound by the context.
Other studies also suggest the multiplicity of Asians' self-concept. Suh (1999) found that Koreans viewed themselves differently across situations more than Americans. Koreans, more than Americans, reported that they were "different" depending on the situation. Similarly, Kanagawa, Cross, and Markus (2001) found that East Asians rated themselves differently depending on who was in the room with them. Finally, Kashima and his colleagues (Kashima, Siegel, Tanaka, & Kashima, 1992) found that Japanese did not expect behavior and attitude to be consistent as much as their Western counterparts did. Japanese reported that having a particular attitude toward an issue did not guarantee a corresponding behavior. Koreans reported a similar opinion about the inconsistency between personal attributes and behavior (Norenzayan, Choi, & Nisbett, 2002) . Koreans maintained, more than Americans, that behavior would be determined by situational factors, not necessarily by dispositional attributes.
All of these studies lead to the possibility that East Asians are chronically more aware of and attuned to the divergent aspects of their behavior than are Westerners. Consequently, East Asians' self-concepts likely consist of a set of more diverse and even contradictory information about the self than their Western counterparts. In terms of availability, inconsistent information about the self must be more available in East Asians' self-concepts. On the other hand, there exists evidence that to the extent that one's self-concept is multifaceted and variable, one is more likely to express divergent and even inconsistent beliefs about the self (e.g., Fazio, Effrein, & Falender, 1981; Kunda, Fong, Sanitioso, & Reber, 1993; McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978; McGuire, McGuire, & Winton, 1979) . Kunda et al. (1993) is particularly relevant to the present study. Kunda and her colleagues showed that even a simple manipulation of changing the direction of a question could shift one's self-concept and that this was particularly true for those whose self-concepts were variable. Participants in one condition of Kunda et al. were asked, "Are you introverted?" whereas participants in another condition were asked, "Are you extroverted?" Partici-pants in both conditions were provided with an identical scale ranging from -5 (very extroverted) to +5 (very introverted) . The researchers reasoned that if people had a coherent and unitary self-concept, their evaluations of whether they were introverted or extroverted must be identical regardless of the direction of the question. However, this was not the case. Kunda et al. found that people judged themselves to be more extroverted when asked if they were extroverted than when asked if they were introverted. Namely, a directional question directed self-evaluations. However, this effect was particularly pronounced for those whose self-concepts were variable.
Kunda et al. divided participants into two groups: those who reported that their behavior was highly variable across situations (high-variable participants) and those who reported that their behavior was consistent (low-variable participants). The researchers found that high-variable participants displayed the effect of directional questions, whereas low-variable participants did not show any indication of the effect. Kunda et al. argued that the high-variable individuals possessed inconsistent and contradictory sets of self-knowledge because they habitually behaved differently in different situations. For those, asking if they were introverted activated the knowledge of their introvertedness, resulting in self-evaluation that they were introverted. For the same reason, they came to believe that they were extroverted when they were asked if they were extroverted. Without the mixed basis of self-knowledge, such a shift of the self-concept would have been unlikely.
The findings of Sanitioso, Kunda, and Fong (1990) make the same point. They found that individuals with an extreme trait (e.g., extremely extroverted or extremely introverted) were less subject to temporary fluctuations in self-evaluations across the context. The self-concept of extremely extroverted people must have plenty of information indicating that they are extroverted but little information pointing to their being introverted or vice versa. In other words, their self-concepts are less mixed and more internally coherent.
Combining the conclusions drawn from the two lines of research above-(a) East Asians' self-concepts are more multifaceted and variable and (b) those whose selfconcepts are multifaceted and variable are likely to display inconsistent beliefs about the self-lends strong support for our dialecticism hypothesis that East Asians will display inconsistent beliefs about the self more than Westerners.
STUDY 1
As an initial step to test our hypothesis, we tried to replicate the finding of Kunda et al. (1993) with the expectation that the directionality effect would be more pronounced for East Asians than for Americans. However, there was a major procedural difference between Kunda et al. (1993) and our Study 1. Kunda et al. (1993) used a between-subject design in which one group of participants was asked if they were introverted and another group of participants was asked if they were extroverted. Kunda et al. then compared the means of the two groups and showed that the means were significantly different. This result was interpreted as reflecting a shift of selfperception by a directional question. However, such a between-subject design does not tell us how much each individual changed his or her self-concept depending on the direction of a question. Thus, Study 1 used a withinsubject design in which all participants were first asked how introverted they were and later asked how extroverted they were, or vice versa. For each question, participants were provided with an identical scale ranging from -5 (very extroverted) to +5 (very introverted). The two questions were interspersed among filler items.
In addition, we varied the specificity of the question. Namely, some participants were asked a general question as to "How introverted (extroverted) are you?" whereas other participants were asked a more specific question of "How introverted (extroverted) are you at family dinner?" Kunda et al. (1993) found that the directionality effect occurred only for a general question for Americans. When American participants (i.e., Princeton students) received a specific question (i.e., are you introverted [extroverted] at percepts 1 ?"), they displayed a fairly consistent pattern of self-evaluations (i.e., no directionality). When a specific context was not provided, there might have been some ambiguities in judging how introverted or extroverted they were. For example, the reference group to whom they could compare themselves might be ambiguous. In addition, the defining features of extroverted or introverted behavior might also have been ambiguous. However, when a specific context (i.e., percepts) was provided, such ambiguities were substantially reduced. Now the participants knew not only whom to compare themselves with (i.e., fellow students at percepts) but also the meanings of extroverted or introverted behavior (e.g., "actively participating in discussion," "being shy of expressing one's opinion"). That is why the participants in Kunda et al. (1993) displayed fairly consistent self-views in the specific question condition.
We wanted to examine if the limiting effect of the specific question described above would be also true for Koreans. In other words, we attempted to see whether the hypothesized cultural difference would be limited to the general question or if it would apply to the specific question as well. If the specificity of the question mediates cultural difference in self-concept flexibility, then the expected cultural difference would be weaker in the specific question condition than in the general question condition. However, if cultural differences in self-concept flexibility were not mediated by the specificity of the question, then the degree of cultural difference would be similar for the general and the specific questions.
Method

PARTICIPANTS
One hundred two (59 men and 43 women) Caucasian American students at the University of Illinois and 124 (74 men and 50 women) students at Seoul National University in Korea participated in the study. Illinois students received a partial course credit for their participation. Korean students participated in the study at the request of their instructor. Because gender of the participants did not produce any effect, it will not be discussed.
PROCEDURE
The study employed a 2 (culture: Koreans vs. Americans) × 2 (specificity: general vs. specific) × 2 (direction of question: introversion vs. extroversion) factorial design. The direction of question was a within-subject variable and the other two factors were between-subject variables.
The study was introduced as a self-perception study to participants. Participants were informed that they would be asked a list of questions about themselves. Participants then received a booklet that included the introversion and the extroversion question as well as 40 filler items. Participants in the general condition received a general question about introversion-extroversion (i.e., "How introverted [extroverted] are you?"), whereas those in the specific condition received a specific question (i.e., "How introverted [extroverted] are you at family dinner?"). For the introversion-extroversion questions, the same 11-point scale ranging from -5 (very extroverted) to +5 (very introverted) was provided. To minimize the possibility that participants might become suspicious and discover the hypothesis, the introversionextroversion questions were interspersed among the filler items. We also counterbalanced the order of the introversion and the extroversion questions. The material was translated and then back-translated for Korean participants.
Results and Discussion
Because each participant responded to the questions of "how introverted?" and "how extroverted?" a difference score between their responses to the two questions would serve as an index of a fluctuation of their selfperception. To make a difference index that corresponds to the effect that Kunda et al. reported, each participant's response to the extroversion question was subtracted from his or her response to the introversion question, hereafter referred to as INT-EXT. (Recall that introvertedness was placed on the positive side of the scale and extrovertedness was placed on the negative scale.) Thus, a value of INT-EXT greater than zero means that a participant considered himself or herself more introverted when asked how introverted he or she was than when asked how extroverted he or she was.
As hypothesized, there was a main effect of culture, F(1, 232) = 4.18, p < .05, η 2 = .02. Namely, INT-EXT of Korean participants (M = .48) was greater than that of American participants (M = -.05): The directionality effect was stronger for Koreans than for Americans. However, this main effect of culture was not qualified by specificity, F < 1. As can be seen in Figure 1 , INT-EXT of Koreans was greater for that of Americans to the same degree in the general condition (.47 vs. -.18) and the specific condition (.48 vs. -.08).
Of importance, Korean participants' INT-EXT was significantly greater than zero in both the general condition (.47), t(67) = 2.15, p < .05, η 2 = .06, and the specific condition (.48), t(55) = 2.22, p < .05, η 2 = .08. This pattern of data clearly illustrates that Koreans' self-evaluations of introversion-extroversion shifted with the direction of a question, regardless of whether the question was general or specific. However, this was not the case for Americans. Americans' INT-EXT was not different from zero in either condition, ts < 1.
Study 1 provides initial support for our hypothesis that Koreans' self-perceptions would be more inconsistent than Americans' self-perceptions. Study 1 also indicates that the cultural difference between Koreans and Americans in self-concept flexibility was not mediated by the specificity of the question: Koreans shifted their judgments of introversion-extroversion with the direction of question even when they received a very specific question, such as "How introverted [extroverted] are you at family dinner?" This can be taken as strong evidence for the role of culture in self-concept flexibility.
It is interesting to note that cultural differences in Study 1 are very similar to the finding of individual differences that Kunda et al. (1993) discovered. In Kunda et al., (1993) "high-variable" participants (i.e., those whose behaviors were less consistent across situations) were highly influenced by the direction of a question but "low-variable" participants (i.e., those whose behaviors were more consistent across situation) were not influenced at all. Korean participants in Study 1 behaved just like the high-variable participants in Kunda et al. (1993) , whereas American participants in Study 1 acted like the low-variable participants in Kunda et al. (1993) . Then, it may seem that the failure to get the effect of directional question on self-evaluations among Americans is incompatible with Kunda et al. (1993) . Recall that Kunda et al. found the directionality effect, at least, in the general question condition. However, the present research did not find the effect in both the general and the specific question condition. There are two possible reasons for this discrepancy.
First, if we assume that some of the American participants in Study 1 were "high variable" and some others were "low variable," then the combination of the responses of the two groups of Americans might have resulted in the null effect. Second, and perhaps more important, a procedural difference between the two studies might have contributed to the null finding. Recall that two separate groups of participants received the introversion and the extroversion question each in Kunda et al. (1993) , whereas each participant received both the introversion and the extroversion question at the same time in our Study 1. Therefore, American participants, who are known to possess a strong need for consistency (Heine & Lehman, 1997; Markus & Kitayama, 1991) , might have tried to be consistent in answering the two questions.
Our Study 1 as well as Kunda et al. (1993) used a single personality dimension of introversion-extroversion to demonstrate the effect of directional questions on selfevaluations. An objection can be raised against this singleitem demonstration, arguing that the results of Study 1 and of Kunda et al. (1993) as well may be limited to the introversion-extroversion dimension. Although this criticism is valid, it is important to note that the introversionextroversion dimension is the strongest factor of the Big Five (Goldberg, 1990; McCrae & Costa, 1997; Piedmont & Chae, 1997) . Furthermore, several cross-cultural studies indicate that Asians, including Koreans, have the same semantic structure of personality traits in the form of the Big Five as Americans and that the introversion-extroversion dimension usually appears first in factor analysis in both cultures. Thus, if any personality dimension is ever to be selected for the purpose of demonstrating the flexibility of the self, then it should be the introversion-extroversion domain. Nonetheless, because the single-item demonstration can be still problematic, Study 2 was conducted in which participants evaluated themselves on several other personality dimensions.
STUDY 2
There was another aspect of Study 2 that made it different from Study 1. Unlike Study 1, Study 2 examined whether Koreans' relative judgments about their personality traits also would display an inconsistent pattern more than those of Americans. One might speculate in response to Study 1 that even if Koreans changed their self-views depending on the direction of the question, they might hold to a firm belief about their relative standings on a personality trait. Intuitively, relative judgments about personality traits (e.g., "How polite am I compared to my peers?") appear to be easier to make and more stable than absolute judgments (e.g., "How polite am I?") because there is an explicit comparison group in relative judgments. If Koreans show a greater fluctuation even in relative judgments than Americans, that would strengthen the main thesis of the present research.
Consider the following question:
Imagine a random sample of 100 students in your college of the same gender as you and who entered college the same year you did. Assume that you yourself are one of those 100 students. How many of the other 99 students do you think are more honest than you are?
This is a simple percentile judgment about the self in relation to others. Now consider another percentile judgment: "How many of the other 99 students do you think are more dishonest than you are?" If an individual reports 25 to the first question and 75 to the second question, that individual holds very consistent beliefs about the self (i.e., no fluctuation in self-evaluations). However, if the individual reports 25 to the first question and 50 to the second question, then it can be said that the individual holds a less consistent (if not contradictory) belief about the self. If one believes that he or she is more honest than his or her peers, then he or she also should believe that he or she is less dishonest than his or her peers! The goal of Study 2 was to examine whether Koreans would show greater fluctuations than Americans even in these relative judgments with respect to several personality trait dimensions.
Method PARTICIPANTS
Twenty Caucasian American students at the University of Illinois and 22 students at Yonsei University in Seoul, Korea, participated in the study. Because 6 Korean students did not mark the gender identification question in their questionnaire, a meaningful analysis of gender could not be performed. Nonetheless, we examined the gender effect for the other participants (13 male Americans and 7 female Americans vs. 13 male Koreans and 3 female Koreans).
PROCEDURE
Participants were asked the self-other comparative question for 20 traits. Among the 20 traits were four pairs of traits semantically opposite to each other: honestdishonest, mature-immature, warm-cold, and politerude. These four pairs were the focus of our analysis and the rest of the traits were filler items.
Specifically, participants were asked the following:
Imagine a random sample of 100 University of Illinois [Yonsei University] students of the same gender as you and who entered college the same year you did. Assume that you yourself are one of those 100 students. How many students among the other 99 students in the sample do you think are more polite [rude] than you are?
Each opposite pair was carefully spaced and interspersed among other traits. The material was translated and then back-translated for Korean participants.
Results and Discussion
The percentile estimates for four positive traits were translated into those corresponding to the percentile estimates for four negative ones. For example, when a participant reported that 25 students were more polite than he or she, we transformed the participant's estimate (i.e., 25) into 75. In contrast, when a participant reported that 75 students were ruder than he or she, then his or her estimate (i.e., 75) was kept. Thus, the comparison for the percentile estimates for a pair of opposite traits (honest vs. dishonest, mature vs. immature, polite vs. rude, and warm vs. cold) could be made.
Participants' percentile estimates for four positive versus four negative traits were averaged, and an ANOVA on those average estimates was performed. Men were more self-serving than women (men's average percentile was 65.37 and women's average percentile was 58.02), F(1, 34) = 5.11, p < .05, η 2 = .12. However, because gender did not interact with culture or valence of traits, gender was not considered in further analyses.
Consistent with past research (for a review, Heine et al., 1999) , there was a main effect of culture with Americans being more self-serving than Koreans, F(1, 40) = 21.19, p < .001, η 2 = .38. However, the primary interest of Study 2 was whether Koreans displayed greater inconsistency in their percentile estimates for positive and negative traits than did Americans. As expected, this was the case, indicated by the significant interaction of culture and valence of traits, F(1, 40) = 17.03, p < .001, η 2 = .30. The average percentiles for Americans were 74.06 for positive traits and 71.60 for negative traits, which were not statistically different, t(19) = 1.47, p > .15, η 2 = .10. In contrast, the percentiles for Koreans were 67.39 for positive traits and 42.72 for negative traits, which were significantly different from each other, t(21) = 5.04, p < .001, η 2 = .55. In other words, Korean participants evaluated themselves very positively, placing themselves in the 67th percentile when the question was phrased positively (e.g., How many are more polite than you?), whereas they evaluated themselves less positively, placing themselves approximately in the 42nd percentile, when the question was phrased negatively (e.g., How many are more dishonest than you?). Furthermore, as can been seen in Figure 2 , for each of the four pairs, Korean participants reported significantly different percentiles, depending on the valence of the trait, ts ranging from 2.11 to 4.88 and ps ranging from .05 to .001 (.17 < η 2 < .54). In contrast, Americans showed a difference in their percentiles only for mature versus immature, t(19) = 2.47, p < .05, η 2 = .24, but not for honest versus dishonest, warm versus cold, and polite versus rude, ts < 1. In short, Study 2 strengthens the findings of Study 1 by showing that Koreans displayed larger variations of self-views even in the relative judgments of multiple personality traits.
An alternative interpretation of the finding of Study 2 seems possible, although we do not consider the alternative interpretation incompatible with our own position. The alternative view argues that Study 2 simply demonstrated cultural differences in self-serving tendencies. In other words, Koreans were less self-serving than Americans in that Koreans acknowledged possessing negative traits more readily than did Americans. Therefore, the finding of Study 2 may not pertain to variability per se but rather to Koreans being more willing to view themselves in a negative light.
2 Although we agree that this interpretation is plausible, we believe that the alternative interpretation raises an important question: Why did Koreans display the self-serving tendency for positive traits as did Americans?
If the self-serving motivation interpretation were valid, then we should expect that Koreans would not display the self-serving bias even for positive traits. However, this was not the case: Koreans displayed strong selfserving judgments for positive traits. How is it possible for an individual to be self-serving and self-effacing at the same time?
We argue that this seemingly paradoxical pattern of judgment by Koreans could occur mainly because they possessed the mixed basis of self-knowledge, indicating, for example, one's honesty and dishonesty at the same time. Otherwise, they should have been either self-serving or self-effacing regardless of the valence of traits. Therefore, at a surface level, the self-serving motivation interpretation is right. Yet, this interpretation makes even more sense when we assume that Koreans' self-concepts are more flexible than Americans' self-concepts.
STUDY 3
Although the results of Studies 1 and 2 provide a converging set of evidence for the main thesis of the present article, another demonstration seemed warranted. This was particularly true because both studies examined selfevaluations about personality traits. The self-concept includes beliefs not only about personality traits but also about other domains such as one's values. If the selfconcept of Koreans indeed possesses conflicting information about the self more than that of Americans, then a similar pattern to the findings of Studies 1 and 2 would be expected to occur in the domain of values. Namely, Koreans should exhibit a greater degree of inconsistency in their value judgments than Americans.
One of the conventional ways to measure one's value is ranking (Rokeach, 1973) . In a typical ranking method, participants are provided with a list of abstract values and asked to rank those values in the order of importance in their life. The basic assumption of this ranking method is that people have a fully developed value hierarchy. Take two values: true friendship and creativity. If an individual believes that true friendship is more important than creativity and this belief is firm and stable, then he or she will consistently place true friendship ahead of creativity. However, if someone does not have such a firm and stable belief but has a dialectical value system in which he or she sees reasons why true friendship can be more important than creativity and why creativity can be more important than true friendship, then the ranking of the values may vary with the context. Therefore, if Koreans' self-concepts were indeed more multifaceted and flexible than Americans' self-concepts, Koreans would be more likely to show fluctuations in their value preference than Americans.
To test the hypothesis, participants were provided with six comparative value statements, of which three statements were opposite to the other three, and were asked how much they agreed on each of them. The statements were as follows:
If an individual agrees with the first value statement in each pair, then he or she is expected to disagree with the second statement in the pair. According to the hypothesis of Study 3, this pattern should be particularly true for Americans than for Koreans.
The six values were carefully sampled from the list of the terminal values in Rokeach (1973) based on the following criteria. First, the relative importance of the first two values (equality vs. ambition) was comparable in the two cultures. If ambition is valued far more than equality by Westerners but the two values are equally important for East Asians, a meaningful comparison is difficult to make. Even if East Asians display a larger fluctuation in their value preference regarding the two values than Westerners, that does not imply that East Asians' selves are more fluid than Westerners' selves. That simply means that the importance of the two values is too close to call in East Asian cultures. Thus, it is very important to achieve the comparability of relative importance of values between the two cultures. For this goal, we relied on the most recent cultural study on values (Peng, Nisbett, & Wong, 1998) . Although Peng et al. (1998) did not directly compare Koreans with Americans, Chinese and Koreans are thought to be more alike in values than Chinese and Americans or Koreans and Americans (Triandis, 1995) comprehensive and accumulative data set of comparisons between Koreans and Americans in values was not available. Thus, the results of Peng et al. (1998) were used to select the appropriate set of values. Peng et al. (1998) reported the composite rankings of Rockeach's terminal values based on five previous studies for Chinese and two previous studies for Americans. They also reported the rating scores of the same list of values by Chinese and Americans measured by Triandis, McCusker, and Hui (1990) . Based on the composite ranking data and rating data cited in Peng et al., it was found that the ambition-equality pair was the most appropriate for the comparability criterion.
In addition, two other pairs of values were purposely selected: exciting life vs. self-respect and true friendship vs. creativity. The first pair of these values was only slightly different in their importance for Americans, whereas the difference in importance of the two values was far greater for Chinese. The reason these two values were included was that it would become a strong demonstration if it could be shown that Koreans display a greater fluctuation even in these values, despite the fact that they were valued more differently by Asians than by Americans. The second pair of values had the opposite characteristic. Namely, the difference in importance was greater for Americans than for Chinese. Thus, if Koreans display greater fluctuations in all three pairs of values than Americans, that could not be explained away by cultural differences in the relative importance of values.
Method PARTICIPANTS
Forty-nine Caucasian American students at the University of Illinois and 52 Korean students at Seoul National University in Korea participated in the study. Illinois students received a partial course credit for their participation. Korean students participated in the study at the request of their course instructor. Because gender did not make any difference in the results, it will not be mentioned.
PROCEDURE
Participants were provided with the six value statements presented above as well as some filler statements. For the value statements, an 11-point scale ranging from -5 (completely disagree) to +5 (completely agree) was provided. To minimize the possibility of participants becoming suspicious, a pair of opposite value statements was sufficiently spaced. Although this may not preclude participants from becoming suspicious, there is no reason to believe that Koreans would be more suspicious than Americans or vice versa.
Results and Discussion
If an individual marked +5 for the statement of "Equality is more important to me than ambition," then the most coherent response to the opposite statement of "Ambition is more important to me than equality" would be -5. Thus, to the extent that the sum of a participant's responses to each pair of opposite value statements deviates from zero, the participant shifted his or her value preference with the direction of comparison. Hence, we took an absolute score of the sum of the participants' responses to each pair of opposite value statements and conducted a 2 (culture) × 3 (three pairs of values) ANOVA.
As expected and can be seen in Figure 3 , Korean participants (M = 1.62) displayed a greater value change than American participants (M = .99), F(1, 99) = 8.18, p < .005, η 2 = .08. More important, this effect was not qualified by which pair of value was considered, F < 1. Korean participants showed a greater shift than American participants in value preference for all three pairs of values.
Study 3 demonstrated again that Koreans' self-views were more flexible and inconsistent than Americans in that Koreans' value judgments varied with the direction of statements. The results of Study 3 are in line with the finding of Peng et al. (1998) . Peng et al. demonstrated that the traditional measurement of values, including ranking, might not be valid in cross-cultural comparisons partly because the reliability of such measurements was particularly low among Asians. Peng and his colleagues argued that a more context-specific measure, such as a scenario, might be more valid in a cross-cultural comparison. The finding of Study 3 provides a theoretical insight about why this might be the case. Because East Asians have a fluid and multifaceted self-concept, they might be able to generate reasons why two opposite statements could be true at the same time, and their value preference could be thus less consistent across time and situation.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We asked at the outset whether East Asians have dialectical self-concepts. The present research says yes to the question. Studies 1 through 3 demonstrated that Koreans changed their evaluations of introversionextroversion (Study 1), self-other comparative judgments with respect to personality traits (Study 2), and value judgments (Study 3) depending on the direction of question or statement more than Americans. We take this converging set of data as strong evidence for our hypothesis that East Asians' dialectical tendency would be applied to self-beliefs.
Tolerance of Contradictions About the Self
The present research is in line with the work on dialectical reasoning by East Asians (Nisbett et al., 2001; Peng & Nisbett, 1999) . The key characteristic of dialectical reasoning by East Asians is the tolerance of contradiction or ambiguity. When two sets of propositions seem to be incompatible with each other, unlike Westerners, East Asians tolerate it, by either accepting the two propositions or making a compromise between them. Such a tendency to leave the state of ambiguity unsolved may be discomforting to Westerners (Peng & Nisbett, 1999) , pushing them to choose either one of the propositions.
The present research clearly demonstrates that such cultural differences in the way of dealing with apparent contradiction or a conceptual ambiguity can be applied to the self-concepts. It is well established within social psychology that Westerners strive to achieve a state of nonambiguity or consistency whenever two or more sets of personal beliefs are incompatible with each other. The sheer number of consistency theories reflects the Western phobia of internal contradictions. Given the findings of the present research, it is not so surprising that cultural differences exist in the cognitive dissonance effect (e.g., Choi, Choi, & Cha, 1992; Heine & Lehman, 1997; Hiniker, 1969) . Generally speaking, the cognitive dissonance effect is harder to obtain among East Asians than among Westerners.
Theoretically, it is prerequisite for the dissonance effect to recognize a contradiction between two cognitions and to believe that this is a problem (e.g., "I did not enjoy the experiment" vs. "I told someone that the experiment was fun"). If an individual does not see having two dissonant cognitions as a contradiction or a conflict, then it is unlikely for the individual to experience a feeling of discomfort (i.e., no dissonance effect). Thus, the failure to obtain the dissonance effect among East Asians might not be so surprising. A recent book chapter ("Yin and Yang of the Japanese Self") by Kitayama and Markus (1998) also is revealing about the thesis of the present research. Kitayama and Markus argue that the Japanese self-concept intrinsically possesses contradictory information about the self and that consistency does not have to be a major concern for Japanese. Instead, the authors argue that maintaining balance, not consistency, between contradictory aspects of the self is the primary goal of Japanese.
Thus, we can speculate that East Asians are more able and willing than Westerners to store incompatible and contradictory information about the self in their selfconcepts. Consequently, East Asians' self-concepts are more mixed than Westerners' self-concepts and this would explain the findings of the present research.
Modesty: Fake or Genuine?
The present research raises a very interesting yet provocative issue concerning the response biases by East Asians. In most cross-cultural studies, researchers try very hard to eliminate the methodological artifacts from their studies so that the observed difference between cultures is based on cultural factors. Among those artifacts is the modesty bias by Asians (Chen, Lee, & Stevenson, 1995) , which means that Asians tend to use moderate values and avoid using extreme ones in rating scales. Hence, a typical remedy to the problem is not to take Asians' numerical responses at face value but to apply some transformations such as standardization to achieve a fair comparison with Americans' responses. The key assumption of this remedy to Asians' modesty bias is that Asians choose to express their thoughts and feelings in a moderate way although they are not moderate in private.
However, the present study offers a fundamentally different point of view about Asians' modesty. Namely, it is inevitable for Asians to be moderate in their public responses not because they want to look moderate but because they are indeed moderate in private beliefs, values, and preferences. Their self-views embrace multiple and sometimes contradictory aspects of the self. They are simultaneously introverted and extroverted, liberal and conservative, polite and rude, and so on. Their selfrepresentations have plenty of evidence for the dual aspects of the self that prevent them from possessing an extreme one-sided position. Therefore, their moderate responses may be as genuine as Americans' extreme responses and need to be taken without any adjustment.
The same logic can be applied to the acquiescence tendency among Asians. When Asians agree on two conflicting statements, some may point out that they are displaying their acquiescence tendency. However, the pres- ent study suggests that it should be entirely possible for Asians to genuinely agree on both statements. Thus, the acquiescence tendency by Asians may not be a response bias and instead may reflect their true mode of thinking, a hypothesis that remains to be tested. NOTES 1. The percepts refer to student discussion groups at Princeton University.
2. We thank Mark Alicke for raising this alternative interpretation.
